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Oles Andriychuk joined Strathclyde (Glasgow, UK) in January 2019 as Senior Lecturer in Law. He is                  
Co-Director of the Strathclyde Centre for Internet Law & Policy and member of Strathclyde Centre for Antitrust 
Law & and Empirical Study. He has completed a monograph on the philosophical foundations of European 
Competition Law and Policy (Edward Elgar, August 2017). His current work focuses, among other things, on 
such phenomena as big data and the power of algorithms, the regulation of social networks and new media, post-truth 
and post-modern law, antitrust and disruptive technologies, electronic communications, platform convergence and net 
neutrality.  
 
 
Resume: One of Oles’s latest research is questioning the political nature of competition 
law – a topic at the same time challenging yet a little provocative in this period of competition law 
turbulence. However, it goes without saying that there is a real need to address the subject: the link 
between law and politics is so obvious that we would be blind not to approach it. Law is political, 
and one speaks well about legislative and jurisprudential policies. However, we often like to believe 
competition law could have escaped this political aspect, thanks to the rationality of the economic 
science and the legal formalism on which its enforcement relies. Plus, it is commonly acknowledged 
that it necessary for competition law to be politically neutral as market regulation crystallizes 
political cleavages and thus implies, as a body of law, a duty of independence in the judgement 
process. In his work, Oles provides for a brilliant and critical analysis of the relationship between 
competition law and politics, questioning the assumption that today competition law is still neutral.  
  
To quote this paper: O. ANDRIYCHUK, M.-S. GARNIER, “On the Political Nature of Competition Law:  
Interview with Oles Andriychuk”, Competition Forum, 2020, art. n° 0002, https://www.competition-
forum.com/on-the-political-nature-of-competition-law-interview-with-oles-andriychuk.  
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1° You draw a distinction between two 
periods: modern and post-modern 
competition law & economics. Could you 
please tell us more about these two 
periods?  
 
Thank you, Maya, David. Congratulation on 
launching such a great initiative. Of course, 
each historical categorisation is non-linear 
and somehow metaphorical. There are no 
signposts on the road of evolution: Pre-
modern; Modern; Post-modern. With this 
caveat in mind, we can clearly see that 
competition law, economics and policy are 
changing and transforming very rapidly, and 
this is not an incremental but qualitative 
change. A jump. For me it is a change, not a 
mutation. I do not pathologize the process, 
but it indeed has some features, which may be 
called problematic.  
So, what do I mean by this catchy 
modern/postmodern categorisation? 
Modernity implies the reliance on rationality, 
calculability, measurability, encyclopedism. 
For decades competition policy was 
inherently modernist – be it the modernism 
of legal formalism or the modernism of 
microeconomic calculus. I am particularly 
focused on the latter, as the former has been 
rebutted so fiercely by most of us anyway. So, 
economically rationalised competition policy, 
or as I label it an “axiomatic” competition 
policy is based on the fundamental 
assumption that there is an economic Truth, 
which we as enforcers, decision-makers, 
members of legal and economic teams have 
to discover. It is a scientification of 
competition policy; in law this connotate well 
with a belief in the inquisitorial model of 
Justice. The Truth exists. And our task is to 
discover it. It reminds me The Emperor's 
New Clothes story, where everybody is 
dancing around the King trying to show to 
him how scientific and truthful their 
econometric modelling (or interpretation of 
legal precedents) are. We were playing this 
game obediently for many years. Everybody 
would have occasional moments of 
scepticism and disbelief. But these were 
refuted and faced stoically as growing pains. 
Nobody wants to look fool in front of the 
King. The truth exists. It’s just me who is 
sceptical. Because I know so little. And they 
do. Mathematics never lies. Neither case-law 
does. In a relatively stable ‘end-of-history’ world 
this vision worked relatively stably. But then the 
critical mass of uncertainties outweighed the 
scale. The concurrent – though not 
necessarily dependent – events such as 
financial crisis, radicalisation of societies and 
polarisation of political elites, digital 
revolution, the emergence of surveillance 
capitalism, maturing of Big Tech, polarisation 
of international trade, turbulences with Euro-
centric vision epitomised in Brexit, current 
pandemic and many other less emblematic 
events have cumulatively disproved the 
religious beliefs in and obedience to the 
universal wisdom of neoclassical economics 
underpinning the axiomatic antitrust. 
Competition policy is moving from 
microeconomics to geopolitics. And this is a 
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move from modern- to postmodern 
competition. Suffices to say two things: 1) 
Postmodern competition policy is inherently 
political. Political choices are not toxic in this 
model. If axioms and sophisticated theories 
contain only one version of truth, and if two 
opposed views can be equally meticulously 
presented using the same apparatus, the 
absolute scientific truth is unachievable. It 
does not exist at all. It is not a category of 
social science. The truth only exists in natural 
sciences, not social ones. 2) Postmodern 
competition policy is ideologically neutral. It 
is descriptive. Not normative. It does not 
bring an alternative agenda. It only relativises 
the absolutism of the two wings of the 
modernist antitrust: legal formalism and 
economic axiomatism. Relativises, not 
refutes. If no truth is absolute, or rather if no 
absolute truth exists, the choice in hard cases 
– and we are not talking about trivial cases – 
is ultimately political. Obviously, political 
does not mean arbitral. The freedom to 
decide is bounded by the institutional 
constraints in which each decision-maker is 
embedded and from which each decision-
maker originates. The choice is still drafted, 
framed in sound legal and economic 
language. Visually, it looks as mainstream as 
each decision made in modernist stage. On 
the appearance they are indistinguishable. 
Just the former pretends to serve the absolute 
truth while the latter only ticks the absolute 
truth box. For the former the truth is the aim; 
for the latter a truth is a necessary condition. 
2° Epistemologists including Friedrich 
von Hayek wrote long ago that the 
methods of social sciences cannot be as 
objective as the ones of hard sciences. 
Economic theories are indeed based on 
premises which are often hardly 
empirically verifiable and can lead to 
completely different solutions depending 
on the political sensibility of the 
economist or the school of thought he 
belongs to. For instance, essential 
facilities are dealt with differently by 
economic theory in the EU and in the US, 
while in both cases, these theories are 
based on a sound and rational method. 
Hence my question: even in the modern 
competition law & economics period, do 
you think that neutrality of economic 
science was factually accurate, or was it 
only a belief? Has there been a real 
“scientific era” of competition law? In 
other words, do you think that things 
have really changed, or is the recognition 
of the political nature of competition law 
& economics just a doctrinal 
acknowledgement of something that has 
always existed? 
 
You are absolutely right. Looking at the 
livelihood of the phenomenon of 
competition through the prism of 
mathematical modelling is and always was 
reductionist and myopic. Hayek was clear 
about it when criticising attempts to visualise, 
comprehend the invisibility of the market’s 
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hand. If you know the technique, you can use 
it everywhere. You can measure love, poetry, 
vine – and you would not be wrong, this 
would be acceptable in many instances. 
Disciplines are inherently expansionist. In the 
stable times using mathematics was beneficial 
for the governments and decision-makers 
more generally. Confronted with so many 
incommensurable choices, they had a chronic 
headache with comparing the incomparable 
and compromising on the uncompromisable. 
And then you have a clear, substantiated 
solution based on calculable metrics. Do not 
look at the scaring formulas and sophisticated 
techniques, these are for the experts. You 
should care about the results. And here they 
are. It was working, and it will continue 
working. Yet in the modernist times there was 
a conventional requirement, a public 
consensus that these models should be 
treated as the reflections of truth, whereas in 
the postmodern times they remain only as 
indispensable conditions for being placed on 
decision-maker’s table. Does the proposed 
solution meet the legal formality and 
economic rationality thresholds, can it be 
framed into their vocabulary, can it look as 
dry, mainstream, non-eccentric decision? If 
yes, thank you, leave it on the table, we will 
decide which one meets better our political 
interests. Add to this another important 
dimension: other powerful jurisdictions do 
apply competition rules selectively and some 
opportunistically. It is a regulatory race to the 
bottom, where all keep their poker faces, but 
only we appear to continue playing by the 
rules and taking them as the absolutes.  
 
 
3° You consider that post-modern 
competition law enforcement is not 
characterized by a quest for the true 
solution anymore but by the task of 
choosing the better one in a political 
sense. This solution has to be at the same 
time politically suitable and scientifically 
correct – i.e. based on sound economics 
and respecting legal formalism. Could we 
thus state that there is a reversal of the 
classical syllogistic reasoning – which is 
starting from the rule and using a 
deductive method to reach the solution 
– as it now seems that we start from the 
solution and then think about the 
possibility to justify it?   
 
I think it is hard to say it in a better way than 
you did. Just to note that it was always the 
case. Nobody enters into the court room 
being driven by the motives of discovering 
the absolute truth. The incentive is to win the 
case. Next trial, next client, diametrically 
different situation – you change your hat 
without a shadow of shame. And again, the 
situation is not pathological. Or at least, it is 
not the aim of the postmodern competition 
theory to offer the remedy to this problem 
(for whom it is a problem). If postmodern 
competition theory has any normative 
agenda, it’s agenda would be the glorification 
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of the competitive process – let the legal and 
economic teams compete. After all such 
dialectics is a value in itself, this is the essence 
of adversarial adjudication in general, and the 
postmodern competition theory does 
recognise this as a new old norm. Do not try 
to comprehend the invisible hand by doing 
mathematical reverse-engineering. Do not try 
to rationalise the decision-making process by 
imposing the metrics of inquisitorial, 
axiomatic jurisprudence. After all, the former 
is the essence of liberal democracy; the latter 
– of authoritarianism. This is not to say that 
the postmodern competition theory adheres 
to non-interventionist laissez-faire ideology. 
No, it is ideologically neutral, and allows a 
greater freedom of choice for those who are 
assigned by the people to make such choices. 
 
 
4° Politics is characterized by its 
flexibility, opportunism and partiality; 
whereas law has to be foreseeable, 
permanent and unbiased. Do you think 
that we are or could be using competition 
rules as a tool to preserve the economic 
interests of EU without discrediting the 
legal nature of competition law? Is there 
a limit to the politization of the 
enforcement of competition rules?  
 
You are right political choices are less 
deterministic than the legal and economics 
ones (pretend to be). I do not advocate the 
need for a greater flexibility per se. Well, in 
some sense I do, but only concomitantly. The 
prescriptive agenda is much thinner than the 
descriptive one, and its central message is that 
you cannot continue playing chess when your 
vis-à-vis play Fischer random chess. You will 
be losing each game. As you are a 
grandmaster, you will be fighting heroically. 
But ultimately, you will lose. But this is not 
my central point. My central point is mainly 
apagogical. Pick randomly any hard 
competition case and read the decision. Do 
you really think that the interests framed in 
the categorical language of the decision are 
prioritised basing on some overarching 
objective truth of wisdom? Each hard case 
has its narrative, driving force regardless of 
how you label the period: premodern, 
modern or postmodern. The indeterminacy is 
always with us. I am not sure about economic 
theory, but legal philosophers have de-
pathologized the indeterminacy ages ago. 
When the world appeared to be stable, it was 
acceptable to play the hide-and-seek game. Is 
it now? And answering the part of your 
question concerning the limits of the 
flexibility and arbitrariness, we all are parts of 
our culture, the human-centred culture 
embedded in the principles of rule of law, 
fairness, non-discrimination, procedural 
neutrality, narrow expert-competence and all 
the rest of it. All these and many other 
limitations are and will always be with us. 
They work as the most reliable safeguards 
against the voluntarism of the benevolent 
dictator. And all these factors are always the 
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ingredients of each decision. You cannot 
overcome them. If you want a straight 
answer, it would be that the political nature of 
the postmodern competition policy implies 
bidding farewell to the absolutism of the 
inquisitorial axiomaticity of competition law, 
economics and policy. It is not an economics- 
or law- free frivolous ruling of political 
arbitrariness.  
 
 
5° You wrote that “[competition policy] is 
only one of many public policies and the 
choice between (and within) them is 
ultimately political one”. Henceforth, 
shouldn’t policymakers assume their will 
to shape the economy according to their 
interventionist strategy by adopting an ad 
hoc policy outside the scope of 
competition rules rather than taking the 
risk of distorting the economic and legal 
concepts long ago established by the case 
law?   
 
This leads us to the question of political 
balancing. Each (major) (political) decision 
leads to many butterfly-effect implications. 
Political decisions often face difficult choices. 
Values, interests, competences, rights, 
benefits – these are all different currencies, 
which can barely manage to find a common 
denominator when discussed internally. The 
problem is that they are convertible. If you 
want to communicate effectively your 
message to lawyers you talk about the norms, 
if you want to be heard by the economists, 
you shape the same interests into the 
language of benefits. If you talk to your 
constituency before the election, your 
vocabulary is readjusted accordingly. All 
interests are incommensurably unique and 
commensurably comparable. And they are 
unique and comparable simultaneously. This 
is what I call in my monograph the dialectics 
of in-/commensurability. Look at the 
decision-making mechanism of the European 
Commission: each Commissioner is 
simultaneously bound by the goal, specific to 
its area of her direct responsibility and the 
holistic interests of the Union (or the 
Commission if you wish). I think we can 
adjust for this purpose the marketplace of 
ideas metaphor. And this apropos, shows a 
short-sightedness of those who believe that 
the independence of competition authorities 
from the broader governmental marketplace 
of ideas – or that the independence of 
competition from political choices – is a 
precondition for the effective functioning of 
the competitive process. This was kind of 
okay in the modern times, when everything 
appeared to be stable and predictable, but 
these days such an enthusiastic campaigning 
for separation of competition agencies and 
policy from broader (geo-)economic agenda 
is either myopic parochialism or institutional 
self-preferencing or both. Competition policy 
is part and parcel of other public policies, and 
other public policies are part and parcel of 
competition policy. After all, we should not 
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forget that such isolationist feeling motivates 
not only competition circles but all other 
policies too. This implies 
compartmentalisation of politics, where 
everybody is concerned with her own value, 
interest, goal, putting it at the centre of the 
political processes.  
 
 
6° What do you think of Commission’s 
project to adopt a special ex ante 
regulation in order to address the issues 
raised by the digital platforms’ economic 
models? 
 
I am all in favour of this and similar initiatives 
of the Commission and some national 
competition authorities (well, the 
Commission is not competition authority – 
this refers us to the discussion in the previous 
paragraph). So, I think it is unavoidable. 
Being fully minded of the specificity of 
competition policy sensu stricto and 
endorsing the importance of its inner 
mechanics so to say, I equally see how 
desperately it struggles to position itself as the 
authority of truth. And I think the blame 
should be equally split between both legal and 
economic wings of the profession. An 
effective competition policy should have two 
hands. They are different in terms of 
functioning, pedigree, priorities and 
consequences, but they should be mindful of 
one another. The phrase “but this is for 
regulators/legislators” is absolutely 
acceptable in the rhetoric of the parties in the 
trial but is not for the enforcers. This is 
particularly the case in the area of the digital 
economy, which is characterised by so many 
obvious specificities that if you just continue 
sitting and preaching the purity of antitrust, 
would redesign the constellation of economic 
forces in the world. Our starting position was 
too strong to feel endangered now. And this 
is a problem. We are already in the stage when 
any idea to introduce a meaningful inter-
platform competition appears to be pathetic. 
If we continue the purity game, we will not 
have strong arguments even in influencing 
intra-platform competition. At the same time, 
we should realise that all these attempts are 
seldom effective. Look at the GDPR, look at 
the Copyright Directive. Big Tech are 
omnipotent not because they are intrusive 
invaders, but because they are the best in 
everything they do. Including in hiring and 
lobbying, including in adapting to the new 
regulatory realities. Add to this the inevitable 
ten-year gap existing between the strategic 
planning teams of Big Tech and our 
regulatory responses. We try to find solutions 
to the situations envisaged in BigTech 
headquarters decade/s ago. And they do not 
stand still, the design new ideas and create 
new puzzles for competition constantly. 
Again, most of them we will be addressed in 
ten years. This is not a bug, but a feature, and 
there is not much we could do about it. And 
this is not to say that the new initiatives are 
futile. They are a must. But we should not 
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expect that they will be very effective. And 
they often backfire, creating new 
opportunities for Big Tech and new barriers 
for newcomers. The most drastic example is 
not even the GDPR but Net Neutrality 
regulation. The prima facie noble principle of 
the Internet speed equality essentially enables 
Big Tech companies to cement their 
dominance. I’ve just finished writing a big 
paper on this problem, in which I try to 
articulate and rebut 7½ myths about Net 
Neutrality happy to discuss it in detail as this 
is in my view one of the ways for Europe to 
recalibrate its shape and position in the global  
digital race. The central idea is that by 
softening the rules and allowing regulatory-
managed speed prioritisation, we could get a 
very powerful tool for boosting new entries. 
Overall, the current format of Net Neutrality 
rules is based on what I call a dial-up 
mentality, which in the age of 5G and 
Internet of Everything appears to be 
rudimentary. We still treat telcos as the 
gatekeepers, offering for online platforms an 
exceptional regulatory bonus: equal speed, 
forgetting that the real gatekeepers are 
platforms, not telcos, and that the best way to 
safeguard the dominance is to raise regulatory 
rules making competition on the merits 
impossible. This is a long conversation 
though, and its nuanced elaboration needs a 
separate occasion.  
 
 
7° Do you consider that the enforcement 
of competition law during the sanitary 
crisis is a manifestation of the post-
modern era you describe? 
 
We clearly see here another manifestation of 
the rock-paper-scissor existential condition 
to which all important decisions are always 
subject to. I think it is a too specific story, 
happening in each turbulent period, but yes, 
it reminds us that competition policy is in 
constant interplay with broader societal 
interests.  
 
 
8° Competition law regulates the market, 
and market regulation is a central 
political issue which crystallizes the 
cleavage between liberal and 
interventionist policies. Provided that 
competition authorities and courts are 
independent from the government as 
from the legislative power, that is to say 
from the elected institutions of a State, do 
you think that they have a sufficient 
democratic legitimacy to take decisions 
with such political implications?  
 
Normatively, I adhere to the view that liberal 
policy could be sharpened by interventionist 
means. Or at least I would not juxtapose 
liberalism and interventionism. The power of 
the invisible hand of the market is not 
diminished by the appropriate regulatory 
interventions. It is rather distorted by the 
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attempts to fully comprehend, visualise, 
mathematise the invisible hand – which is 
often done for justifying non-intervention. 
The idea of the invisible hand and the 
spontaneous order is not that they could and 
should function without regulatory 
intervention, but that they capture the 
mystery of entrepreneurial creativity, the 
perpetual discovery process. In this sense 
they generate a real economic value and 
constitute the essence of liberal democracy. I 
think I’ve called them in my book “societal 
libido”. The libido, the creative energy, the 
passion is the main driving force of our life, 
but if left unregulated, untamed, it leads to 
ruinous destructive implications. Same with 
the invisible hand. We should not calculate it 
– it is futile – but it is perfectly acceptable, and 
even necessary to shape, steer, direct and 
cultivate the process. As to the part of the 
question concerning the legitimacy mandate, 
I think my answer to this would be very 
formal: any public institution, established 
according to legally binding rules is legal and 
holds the legitimacy mandate. In this sense, 
for instance, the legitimacy of the European 
Parliament before and after 1979 does have 
only cosmetic differences. So, regardless of 
the specificities of each national mechanism 
of the distribution of competences within the 
state – I leave aside extreme cases, which are 
probably much less relevant to our field – the 
legitimacy mandate is with the institution.  
 
 
Let me at the end express my sincere 
congratulation to such a fantastic initiative. I 
am sure your project will establish an 
appealing and fresh voice in the global 
competition circles. Let me separately thank 
you for such wise, well-calibrated and 
thought-provoking questions. It was my 
pleasure to answer them.  
 
Interview by Maya-Salomé GARNIER 
 
 
 
